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a b s t r a c t
Employing standard informed trading intuition, we develop testable hypotheses regarding short selling
before and after bank enforcement action (EA) initiations. For U.S.-listed bank ﬁrm data for 2007 to 2012,
we ﬁnd strong support for differentiated short seller activity and skill in crisis versus non-crisis periods. In ﬁnancial crises, short sellers predominantly position prior to EAs. The EA initiations then act
as information-homogenizing and proﬁt-taking events reducing incentives to remain positioned. In contrast, EAs in non-crisis periods appear to serve as wake-up calls that attract additional short selling. Our
ﬁndings offer potentially important insights for regulators considering short sellers’ reactions to EA announcements in general, during ﬁnancial crises, and when not experiencing a broad ﬁnancial crisis.

1. Introduction
Enforcement actions (EAs) initiated by bank regulators can remain in effect for years. The most serious actions can restrict a
bank’s growth, halt shareholder distributions, and mandate capital raises. Some banks fail while operating under an EA. A regulator’s public disclosure of EA initiation informs not only the bank’s
depositors but also its equity investors. Our research investigates
whether short sellers establish positions in anticipation of EA initiations, and whether those positions are modiﬁed in response to
the initiations. Additionally, during ﬁnancial crises, bank ﬁrm short
selling may be elevated, even in ﬁrms never receiving an EA. Accordingly, we are particularly interested in analyzing the nature of
period-speciﬁc EA-related short selling.
Prior theoretical considerations of information acquisition and
related trading asymmetries motivate our framework for hypotheses development.1 Conceptually, the potential for informed-trading
proﬁts incentivizes short sellers to undertake costly investments to
acquire and process value-relevant information. For banking ﬁrms,
short sellers’ investments could include the legal acquisition of
call report data, proposed changes in regulation of the industry,
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and regional economic data as well as its time-consuming processing, analysis, and synthesis.2 Our monthly aggregate short interest observations do not permit us to address the microstructural
and broader welfare impacts of short seller positioning and adjustments around the time of EAs. They do, however, allow us to
document predictable patterns likely of interest to banks, their investors and regulators, and to future researchers who have access
to transaction-level data.
A banking regulator’s EA initiation typically follows months
of deliberations informed not only by public call report information and ﬁnancial ﬁlings, but also by non-public information obtained from periodic on-site examinations and discussions with
bank management. Accordingly, the months leading up to a regulator’s ultimate decision to initiate an EA offer a potentially opportunistic time for short sellers to invest in information acquisition
and its processing. In this vein, we expect short sellers to establish
positions months prior to EA initiations and for the cross-sectional
allocation of short positioning to reﬂect short seller skill. Data from
our sample of 628 bank ﬁrms and 180 EAs initiated during 2007
to 2012 conﬁrm these expectations. Driven heavily by exposure
in ﬁrms that eventually delist (due to bank failure or inability to
maintain exchange requirements), short selling is abnormally high
during the 12 months leading up to an EA initiation. Additionally,

2
We are not suggesting that such activities extend beyond that permitted by law.
An assumption of illegal insider trading is not necessary to motivate our hypotheses.
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period.5 Our results provide strong support for our hypotheses
of crisis versus non-crisis differentiation in short selling behavior around EAs. Prior to EA initiations, short selling is abnormally
high (low) in the crisis (non-crisis) period. Following EA initiations,
short selling positions decrease during the crisis but increase in the
non-crisis period. EA initiations incent divestment (proﬁt-taking)
during a crisis but incent investment (increased short positioning)
during non-crisis times. We conclude that analyzing the 2007 to
2012 period as a whole without controlling for differentiation in
the crisis and non-crisis periods, can lead to misleading inferences.
We also develop and test hypotheses of differentiated short
selling skill in crisis versus non-crisis periods. Given our conceptual
framework where informed-trading proﬁts arise from prior costly
investments in information and analysis, we maintain a focus on
short sellers’ skill in deriving proﬁt from the expertise thereby acquired, i.e., cross-sectional allocation skill. For pre-EA positioning,
we ﬁnd robust evidence of short seller skill in both the crisis and
non-crisis periods, but at a signiﬁcantly attenuated level during a
crisis. For positioning in ﬁrms operating with an EA that eventually
survive the EA (i.e., do not fail or delist), we ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant cross-sectional allocation skill in the non-crisis period but
much less in the crisis.
For non-crisis post-announcement delister positioning, however,
in contrast to the usual skill-related negative relationship, we observe some incidence of positive (negatively skilled) relationships
between positioning and subsequent return. Given the potential
for inverted realized skill in non-crisis times, it need not follow
that a crisis would be expected to result in even larger magnitudes
for an inverted skill-related relationship. Indeed, our crisis postannouncement delister sample exhibits the usual negative relationship. The notable departure in non-crisis times coincides, likely not
coincidentally, with the aforementioned inﬂux of “awakened” additional post-announcement short seller positioning in non-crisis
delisters. Some of that post-announcement positioning appears to
be spectacularly wrongly allocated in the cross-section of delisters.
Such a ﬁnding suggests that while post-announcement bank short
sellers “awakened” by EAs in non-crisis times may beneﬁt on average as prices decline on the road to delisting, a long-short hedge
fund across non-crisis “known” delisters could invite spectacular
failure.
Our ﬁndings have potential import for regulators concerned
about differential reactions of short sellers to EA announcements in
general, during ﬁnancial crises, and when not experiencing a broad
ﬁnancial crisis. A growing literature concludes that short sellers are
informed traders. During the ﬁnancial crisis, short sellers detected
ﬁrms with exposure to risky assets (Hasan et al., 2015), prior to
write-downs (Liu et al., 2012), and earlier than accountants or analysts (Desai et al., 2016). Balasubramnian and Palvia (2018) analyze
OCC-regulated ﬁrms and propriety supervisory ratings (CAMELS)
for 2004 to 2012 and conclude short sellers provide early signals
of ﬁnancial distress.
Perhaps most relevant to our work, Berger et al. (2021) ﬁnd that
EAs are effective in reducing systemic risk (impacting bank leverage and portfolio risk) and have greater impact during ﬁnancial
crises than in normal times. Our ﬁnding that EAs correlate with a
reduction in crisis-era short selling adds another reason why crisisera EAs may attenuate, rather than exacerbate, systemic risk. To
our knowledge, our investigation is the ﬁrst to analyze the relationship between EAs and short sellers’ positioning and potential
proﬁts in crisis and non-crisis periods.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the
EA event timeline and partition of crisis and non-crisis pe-

and even more broadly, short seller allocation skill is evident. We
document signiﬁcant negative relationships in the cross-section of
positions and subsequent returns.3
An EA announcement diminishes important informational
asymmetry regarding the bank’s distress and its position with bank
regulators.4 We hypothesize that EA-related restrictions along with
additional monitoring, higher public scrutiny, and likely diminished
market capitalization limit future opportunities for short sellers to
generate trading proﬁts from additional investments in information asymmetry. Consistent with a hypothesis that after an initiation short sellers are more likely to shift resources to prospecting for opportunities in other bank ﬁrms, we ﬁnd on average less
short selling in ﬁrms operating with an EA than in comparable
ﬁrms that never receive one. For some banks operating with an
EA, however, proﬁtable informed trading opportunities still exist.
For such banks, short sellers likely have an incentive to maintain,
or even increase, positioning in response to their ongoing information collection and analysis related to predicting extreme negative outcomes. About 40% (73) of the 180 EA ﬁrms in our sample appear to be likely candidates for sustained or increased short
selling. These ﬁrms, while operating with an EA, ultimately delist
when their bank(s) fail or when they are unable to maintain their
U.S. exchange’s minimum listing requirements (e.g., equity price of
at least a dollar per share). Interestingly, however, delisting ﬁrms
avoid EA-related proﬁt taking’s diminished positioning (on average) only when we restrict attention to ﬁrms having suﬃciently
high remaining post-announcement market cap. Even there, postannouncement positioning increases are insigniﬁcant. Overall, for
our sample of 180 ﬁrms receiving an EA in 2007 to 2012, we ﬁnd
strong support for the hypothesis that EAs have a relevant information homogenization effect. In reducing short sellers’ incentives to
remain positioned, EAs serve as a signiﬁcant opportunity for proﬁttaking. Still, subsequent to EAs, remaining abnormal short selling
and subsequent returns generally perpetuate a skill-related negative relationship.
We next examine whether analyzing the 2007 to 2012 period
overall masks differentiated short selling activity in crisis and noncrisis periods. During ﬁnancial crises, more bank ﬁrms are likely
to experience distress and extreme negative outcomes (e.g., bank
failure and insolvency). We hypothesize that this creates more incentivizes for short sellers to identify and initiate short positions
prior to EA initiations in a ﬁnancial crisis than in a non-crisis period. It also creates greater incentives to take proﬁts and reduce
positions once an EA is initiated. The EAs’ information homogenizing effect suggests that short sellers may be better off redeploying their human and ﬁnancial capital towards prospecting for
pre-EA ﬁrms. In contrast, in non-crisis times, we hypothesize that
short sellers in general expend fewer resources analyzing banking
ﬁrms. Rather than inducing proﬁt-taking, EA initiations may then
act as a wake-up call (i.e., impose a “fear of missing out”). If so,
EAs may attract additional short sellers’ ﬁnancial and human capital (compared to similar ﬁrms not operating with an EA) to ferret
out those ﬁrms that are over-valued and might experience extreme
outcomes.
For our crisis versus non-crisis analyses, we deﬁne 2007 to
2009 as the crisis period and 2010 to 2012 as the non-crisis

3
Consistent with others (e.g., Karpoff and Lou, 2010), we proxy for short seller
skill as a negative relationship between monthly short interest and subsequent
month return.
4
As we discuss in the Internet Appendix, the regulator “announces” (publishes
on its website) the initiation of the EA almost immediately. Given the periodicity of
our monthly short interest data, we treat EA initiation and EA announcement as the
same date and use EA initiation and EA announcement interchangeably throughout
the paper.

5
We use the end of 2009 as the break between periods as in Berger and Bouwman (2013).
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Fig. 1. Timeline of the enforcement action (EA) event. As shown in the timeline, some ﬁrms receive multiple formal EAs. As discussed in Section 2.1, we use the initiation
of the ﬁrst formal EA the ﬁrm receives as the “EA initiation event”.

riods. Section 3 provides the related hypotheses development.
Section 4 describes our banking ﬁrm sample and empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
2. Event timelines
2.1. Enforcement action (EA) events
Fig. 1 displays the timeline for EA events. Prior studies of banks
and bank regulators conclude that regulators may use the most
severe types of EAs (prompt corrective actions, cease and desist
orders, formal agreements and written agreements) as a last resort. As a result, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial condition can deteriorate substantially prior to the initiation (Delis et al., 2017). As described in
Section 4.1, our analysis examines these most severe types of EAs.
While operating under an EA, the ﬁrm or its bank(s) may receive
additional EAs. Many ﬁrms “survive” the EAs, which we deﬁne as
regulators’ termination of all EAs while the ﬁrm’s equity remains
listed. Other ﬁrms are acquired while operating with at least one
EA, delist concurrent with bank failure(s), or delist for other reasons (such as the inability to continue to meet minimum listing
requirements) while still operating under at least one EA.
As shown in Fig. 1, ﬁrms can receive multiple EAs. We deﬁne
the earliest initiation as the EA initiation event. For example, on
Sept. 15, 2009, Tamalpais Bancorp, a bank holding company, received its earliest initiation, which was an FDIC cease & desist order for its bank. Subsequent events (while the ﬁrm operated with
the FDIC C&D order) were a Jan. 2010 FRB written agreement initiation with the holding company and a Feb. 2010 FDIC escalation
action (prompt corrective action proscriptions on the bank). The
bank failed and the holding company delisted in Apr. 2010. We deﬁne Sept. 15, 2009, as the EA initiation event for our analyses.
Fig. 2. Calendar time of enforcement action (EA) initiation events and return
indices. The upper panel shows the number of ﬁrms that receive an EA initiation per calendar quarter in the crisis and non-crisis periods. The lower panel reports the buy-and-hold return for each of four equity indices purchased at the end
of 2006. The indices are constructed from CRSP value-weighted (v.w.), and equalweighted (e.w.) returns and value-weighed and equal-weighted returns for the 628
bank-ﬁrm sample (Bank v.w. and Bank e.w.).

2.2. Crisis and non-crisis periods
Fig. 2 (upper panel) shows our sample of 180 unique ﬁrms partitioned by EA initiation event for each calendar quarter in the crisis (2007 – 2009) and non-crisis (2010 – 2012) periods. We break
3
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crisis and non-crisis at the end of 2009 as in Berger and Bouwman (2013), who note that by the ﬁrst quarter of 2010, many ﬁnancial institutions had repaid TARP money. The lower panel of
Fig. 2 shows buy-and-hold returns for CRSP and bank ﬁrm valueweighted and equal-weighted indices. We construct the bank indices using our 628 bank-ﬁrm sample described in Section 4.1 that
includes the 180 ﬁrms that receive an EA and all other publiclytraded bank ﬁrms that do not. Both CRSP indices and the bank
value-weighted index recover sharply starting in second quarter
2009.

general theoretical notions regarding informed traders who invest in information, analysis and expertise to subsequently gain
from trading motivate H1 and H2. They also motivate an inquiry
into the nature of short seller positioning and skill after EA announcements.9 Once an EA is initiated, equity price adjusts to reﬂect public expectations for the bank’s future operations under the
publicly-announced EA.10 Even though its main objective is inﬂuencing the ﬁrm’s available actions, the EA’s announcement typically leads to more homogenized information. When the EA is perceived as negative news, the result is lower equity trading prices
and therefore market cap. Accordingly, short sellers’ incentives to
invest additional ﬁnancial and human capital to create additional
post-announcement information or analytic advantage can be signiﬁcantly diminished by EA announcements. This, in turn, leads
to EA-related proﬁt-taking and de-positioning. A possible exception is for banks having suﬃcient remaining market cap after the
announcement but eventually failing. For contexts including such
banks, additional short seller investment in asymmetric information or analysis to differentiate amongst banks operating with an
EA could provide an opportunity for additional short seller trading proﬁts. Following EA announcements, we considered outcomecontingent differentiations:

3. Hypotheses development
In this section, we develop testable hypotheses regarding bank
equity short selling prior to, and following, enforcement action
(EA) initiations in general, and for differentiations related to crisis
and non-crisis periods.
3.1. Short selling prior to EA initiations
Supervisory ratings downgrades frequently precede EAs
(e.g., Brunmeier and Willardson, 2006). Combined with
Balasubramnian and Palvia’s (2018) ﬁnding of increased short
selling around downgrades, there is signiﬁcant support for the
premise that short sellers frequently establish positions prior to
EA initiations. We carry that premise forward into our inquiry.

H3Survives : For banking ﬁrms that survive subsequent to operating under an EA, abnormal short interest decreases from its
pre-EA level.
H3Delists : For banking ﬁrms that delist while operating under
an EA, abnormal short interest may increase, decrease or not
change depending on the context.

H1: In the months prior to the EA, a banking ﬁrm’s short interest is abnormally high.

The EA-induced repricing and diminished asymmetry may eliminate many of short sellers’ opportunities to invest in, and beneﬁt
from, the creation of new trading advantages. For those short sellers who do invest, however, we would expect cross-sectional allocation skill to continue to exhibit itself analogously to the pre-EA
period.

Some ﬁrms experience negative price momentum prior to EA
initiations.6 Thus, one would expect skilled short seller positions
established prior to EA initiations to precede subsequent negative
returns. Such a ﬁnding, however, could merely reﬂect look-ahead
bias created by requiring the subsample of banking ﬁrms to experience a future EA. A broader literature, not speciﬁc to banks, but
similarly exposed to look-ahead bias, documents proﬁtable prenegative-event short selling. Regarding short seller skill, however,
that literature suggests that at least some short sellers are skilled
fundamental analysts who detect mispriced ﬁrms more generally
than just preceding a subsequently-identiﬁable negative event (like
an EA).7 We adopt a more demanding notion that short seller skill
be exhibited through cross-sectional selectivity in the subset of
ﬁrms that subsequently experience EAs.8 That is, it is reasonable
to conjecture that skilled short sellers tilt their positioning toward
(i.e., establish larger positions in) banks that will subsequently experience more negative price revisions by the dates of their EA initiations.

H4: For banking ﬁrms operating under an EA, abnormal short
interest following an EA is negatively related to subsequent
returns.
3.3. Short selling in ﬁnancial crisis versus non-crisis periods
Returning to our theoretical motivation for costly short seller
investment in creating information or analytic skill trading advantages, during ﬁnancial crises banks on average may be more likely
to experience extreme negative outcomes (e.g., bank failure) than
in non-crisis periods. The potential for bank failures could therefore offer a higher-than-normal aggregate proﬁt opportunity for
short sellers active in a ﬁnancial crisis. Accordingly, other things
being equal (including the supply of capital for short selling), short
sellers might be expected to invest more heavily in producing
asymmetry from which to proﬁt during the crisis. This leads us to

H2: In the months prior to an EA, a banking ﬁrm’s abnormal
short interest is negatively related to subsequent returns.
3.2. Short selling after EA initiations
To a great extent, we merely inherited H1 and H2 from prior
empirical research on short selling in other contexts. That said,

9
In a Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) style competitive information acquisition
equilibrium, everyone has access to the same information technology and makes
only enough proﬁts to offset the cost of their individual investment. We do not
need that competitive equilibrium assumption to motivate the basic idea that trading proﬁts will likely be high when short sellers can spend to become asymmetrically informed or talented in analysis. Indeed, we would arrive at the same negative relationship between abnormal short selling and future abnormal returns with
a single trader having a monopolistic right to spend to become asymmetrically informed or advantaged in analysis.
10
Studies by Brous and Leggett (1996), Slovin et al. (1999), and
Jordan et al. (20 0 0) document a negative market reaction to EA initiations.
Gilbert and Vaughan (2001) conclude depositors do not react negatively to EA
disclosures. Roman (2020) ﬁnds stock price declines for the bank’s relationship
corporate borrowers.

6

For example, see Jordan et al., (20 0 0).
Examples, not speciﬁc to banking, include Akbas et al., (2017), Henry et al.,
(2015), and Karpoff and Lou (2010).
8
Framing selectivity and/or market timing skill as a beneﬁcial covariance between asset allocation weights and subsequent returns appears in many contexts,
including its early motivation in Grinblatt and Titman (1989). We do not observe
a short-seller’s total portfolio returns, nor the costs related to that portfolio. Here
we consider only the distribution of the magnitudes of short positions in EA banks,
thus the characterization of this hypothesis as “selectivity” across banks rather than
“timing” for a given bank.
7
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initiation to delisting date).12 Fourteen ﬁrms that receive initial EAs
in 2007 – 2012 continue to operate under at least one EA continuously as of the end of 2015.
As an indication of the impact for the ﬁrm’s shareholders (and
opportunity for short sellers), we calculate buy-and-hold returns,
measured from the day of initiation of the ﬁrst EA until the ﬁrm
recovers, delists, is acquired, or the end of 2015 (for ﬁrms still
listed with an EA). Table 1 Panel A reports these raw returns as
well as “excess return” (versus CRSP value-weighted return). Firms
with the worst returns are those that delist due to bank failure
or other reason (a mean raw return of -93.2% and -74.7%, respectively). Buy-and-hold returns for ﬁrms that survive EAs are not
much different from the CRSP value-weighted index with a mean
of -0.5% and median of 8.2% versus the index over the 3-year average duration under an EA.
Additional information in Table 1 Panel A describes the outcomes by year the ﬁrst EA is initiated.13 The years with the highest number of ﬁrst EAs are 2009 and 2010.14 For the 73 ﬁrms that
delist (due to bank failure or other reasons), ﬁrst EA initiations occur most frequently in 2009. Only four of the ﬁrms that receive
initiations in 2011 or 2012 delist.

conjecture that several of our previously hypothesized short positioning relationships may be even more pronounced during a
market-wide ﬁnancial crisis.
H1Crisis : Abnormal short interest in EA ﬁrms prior to their EAs
is higher in ﬁnancial crises than in non-crisis periods.
If as H1Crisis suggests, average pre-EA short-selling in EA banks
is higher in a ﬁnancial crisis, and there are more extreme negative outcomes (almost deﬁning a “ﬁnancial crisis”), there is almost
certainly more capital at work seeking pre-EA positioning. What
does a crisis-related increase in aggregate capital seeking pre-EA
positions suggest for H2’s hypothesized negative correlation between on-average larger crisis-period pre-EA positions and their
related subsequent crisis-era returns? We expect crisis-era competition with its more informative pre-EA prices, potential inﬂux of
marginally less talented short selling, and greater bunching of returns in the neighborhood of a binding lower bound of -100% all
to result in attenuated aggregate pre-EA short seller skill.
H2Crisis : The negative relationship between abnormal short interest in EA ﬁrms prior to their EAs and subsequent returns
is weaker during a ﬁnancial crisis.

4.2. Abnormal short interest, returns, and other variables

A broad ﬁnancial crisis also likely reﬂects conditions where
short sellers can beneﬁt by taking proﬁts at the EA and redirecting capital towards prospecting for pre-EA banking ﬁrms which are
(temporarily) in relatively greater aggregate supply.

We use raw short interest ratio and abnormal short interest ratio as measures of short selling. Raw short interest ratio equals
the shares short at month end (Compustat) divided by shares outstanding (CRSP).15 As in Desai et al. (2016), we use the Karpoff and
Lou (2010) abnormal short interest ratio regression model that incorporates ﬁve factors: size, book-to-market, momentum, turnover,
and institutional ownership. Abnormal short interest (ABSI) equals
the ﬁrm’s raw short interest ratio minus that predicted by the
model.
Monthly return data are from CRSP. Additional analysis variables are bank capital ratios, non-performing loans, bank Z-scores,
and bank liquidity as deﬁned in Deli et al. (2019) using Compustat data at the ﬁrm level. Other control variables are size, book-tomarket, momentum, institutional ownership, and turnover. Size is
market capitalization (CRSP). Book-to-market is book value (Compustat) divided by market capitalization. Momentum is 12-month
cumulative return. Institutional ownership is shares owned by institutions (Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database)
scaled by shares outstanding (CRSP). Turnover is the monthly share
volume divided by shares outstanding (CRSP). Table 1 Panel B
presents summary statistics for ﬁrm-month observations for the
628 ﬁrms.
Fig. 3 shows (for the 180 EA ﬁrms) buy-and-hold abnormal returns, ABSI, and the number of ﬁrms that delist in EA event time
“t” for 12 months before and after the initiation, where initiation
is event month “t” equals 0. The upper panel shows means of abnormal buy-and-hold returns BHAR[-12,t]. Abnormal return equals
the EA ﬁrm’s return minus the CRSP value-weighted return. BHAR
trends negatively on average and more so in the crisis. The middle
panel shows ABSI[t]. ABSI is higher on average for ﬁrms with EA
initiations in the crisis. The bottom panel shows by event month
the number of ﬁrms that delist during the ﬁrst 12 months the ﬁrm

H3Crisis : In a ﬁnancial crisis, abnormal short interest decreases
more from its pre-EA level.
A crisis-related de-emphasis on post-announcement banks operating under EAs suggests attenuated investment and related
post-announcement skill in the cross-section of those banks.
H4Crisis : In a ﬁnancial crisis, abnormal short interest following
an EA announcement is less negatively related to subsequent
returns.
4. Sample description and analyses
4.1. The bank ﬁrm universe and EA sample
As discussed in Section 2, 180 ﬁrms within our 628 bank-ﬁrm
dataset receive at least one EA initiation during 2007–2012. We analyze only those EAs that impose constraints on growth, distributions, and capital raises as described in Delis et al. (2017) as Class
1 actions. For ﬁrms that receive multiple Class 1 EA initiations, we
use the earliest EA.11 We assign each EA ﬁrm one of ﬁve outcomes:
“survives EA” (i.e., all EAs are terminated by the regulator while
the ﬁrm remains listed), “acquired” without regulator assistance by
another ﬁrm while operating with at least one EA, “delists when
bank fails”, “other delisting” while operating with at least one EA
(e.g., the ﬁrm can no longer maintain exchange requirements such
as price of at least $1/share), or “still listed with EA” as of the end
of 2015.
Table 1 Panel A shows that about a third of ﬁrms (63 ﬁrms) survive EAs. They operate under one or more EAs for almost 3 years
(duration mean is 35.1 months). Firms that have the shortest time
operating under EAs on average are those that delist concurrent
with bank failure (duration mean of just 7.4 months) followed by
ﬁrms that delist for other reasons (15.1 months measured from EA

12
All except one of the ﬁrms that delist due to bank failure operate with an EA
for at least a month prior to and at the time of failure. The exception is Washington
Mutual, which failed in September 2008.
13
Outcomes by regulator are provided in the internet appendix.
14
Four ﬁrms receive initiations during the time the 2008 short sale ban is in effect (i.e., Sept. 19 through Oct. 7). One of the ﬁrms fails 8 months later. The other
three survive for at least two and a half years.
15
Short interest reporting frequency is twice per month during our sample period.
We use short interest measured closet to month end. For dual share class ﬁrms, we
use the common share class with the highest trading volume.

11
An internet appendix provides a detailed description of how we constructed the
628-ﬁrm dataset.
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Table 1
Summary statistics.
Panel
A
All Firms
By Outcome
Survives EA
Acquired
Delists when bank fails
Other delisting
Still listed with EA
Outcomes by year initiated
Survives EA
Acquired
Delists when bank fails
Other delisting
Still listed with EA
All
Panel B
Short interest ratio (%)
ABSI (%)
Return (%)
Size (in million $)
Book-to-market
Momentum
Turnover
Inst. ownership
Bank capital
Non-perform loans
Bank Z-score
Bank liquidity

Duration (months)

Buy and hold return

Excess return

Obs.

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

180

24.7

21.3

-13.6%

-45.8%

-44.5%

-70.4%

63
30
30
43
14
2007
1
2
0
1
0
4
Monthly Obs.
31,187
31,187
31,187
31,187
31,187
31,187
31,187
31,187
31,187
31,187
31,187
31,187

35.1
15.8
7.4
15.1
63.0
2008
2
4
7
6
0
19
Mean
3.235
0.152
-0.401
1180.6
1.284
-0.038
0.081
0.337
0.146
0.032
31.78
0.053

32.0
11.8
6.7
12.8
63.7
2009
14
4
18
20
1
57
Median
1.509
-0.107
-0.147
144.2
0.993
0.018
0.039
0.285
0.138
0.022
23.20
0.039

46.2%
16.2%
-93.2%
-74.7%
11.0%
2010
28
9
4
13
6
60
Std. dev.
4.305
2.891
12.314
4181.1
0.958
0.402
0.112
0.245
0.040
0.032
29.46
0.044

36.1%
-5.8%
-95.6%
-82.4%
-25.7%
2011
10
7
1
2
5
25

-0.5%
-1.3%
-105.6%
-92.1%
-58.2%
2012
8
4
0
1
2
15
25th %-tile
0.062
-1.190
-5.677
48.3
0.733
-0.210
0.014
0.124
0.121
0.010
10.11
0.023

8.2%
-27.9%
-106.6%
-95.0%
-82.1%
Total
63
30
30
43
14
180
75th %-tile
4.892
0.782
4.912
499.5
1.453
0.194
0.100
0.528
0.161
0.043
42.88
0.067

Panel A reports summary statistics by outcome for the 180 ﬁrms that receive EAs during 2007–2012. Duration is the time the
ﬁrm operates with EAs (or from initiation to delisting). Buy-and-hold return and return minus CRSP value-weighted return
(excess return) are from the initiation of the EA until the ﬁrm survives, delists, or is acquired. Firms still listed with at least
one EA are as of the end of 2015. Lower rows report number of observations by outcome for year of initiation. Panel B
reports summary statistics for the variables used for benchmarking and analysis. Firm-month observations are for all ﬁrms
with (180 ﬁrms) or without (448 ﬁrms) an EA during the 2007–2012 sample period. Short interest ratio is common shares
short (Compustat) divided by common shares outstanding (CRSP). ABSI is abnormal short interest ratio obtained using the
Karpoff and Lou (2010) ﬁve-factor model. Return is buy-and-hold return (CRSP). Size is market capitalization (closing price
multiplied by shares outstanding, CRSP). Inst. ownership is shares owned by institutions scaled by shares outstanding. Bookto-market is book value (Compustat) divided by market capitalization. Momentum is 12-month cumulative return. Turnover is
the monthly share volume divided by shares outstanding (CRSP). Bank capital is the total of Tier 1 and 2 capital divided by
risk-weighted assets. Non-perform loans is non-performing loans divided by total loans. Bank Z-score is the sum of return on
bank assets and bank capital, divided by the standard deviation of return on ﬁrm assets for the prior 5 years of quarterly data.
Return on bank assets is the ﬁrm’s before-tax proﬁt divided by total assets. Bank liquidity is cash and due from banks plus
federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell divided by total assets. Bank variables are at the ﬁrm
level for most recent quarter (Compustat).

operates with the EA. It is worth noting that ABSI in Fig. 3 benchmarks “abnormal” short selling using the 5-factor model but does
not control for short selling that would be “normal” for bank ﬁrms
with similar fundamentals (e.g., bank capital ratios) that never receive an EA.

Returni,t =

4.3. Two-stage regression speciﬁcation and results
Our panel includes the observations for all banking ﬁrms during 2007 to 2013 irrespective of whether the ﬁrms experience an
EA. In order to investigate potentially different structural relationships between endogenous short seller positioning before and after
EAs and the subsequent returns, we adopt the following two-stage
regression speciﬁcation for the endogenous metric Abnormal Short
Interest (ABSI) for ﬁrm i at calendar month t from the beginning
of our sample and subsequent return:

ABSIi,t =

β0 + β1 ABSIhi,t−1 + β2 Befeai,t−1 x ABSIhi,t−1
+β3 Befeai,t x delists x ABSIhi,t−1
+β4 Afteai,t−1 x ABSIhi,t−1
+β5 Afteai,t x delists x ABSIhi,t−1 + β6 Befeai,t−1
+ β7 Befeai,t x delists + β8 Afteai,t−1
+β9 Afteai,t x delists + β10 Log(Size )i,t−1
+β11 Book − to − marketi,t−1
+β12 Momentumi,t−1 + mi,t

(2)

where ABSIhi,t-1 is the ﬁtted (without the ﬁrst-stage error term
μi,t ) abnormal short interest from the ﬁrst stage. Consistent with
the short selling literature for non-bank speciﬁc analyses (e.g.,
Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Desai et al., 2016), the benchmark metric
abnormal short interest (ABSI) compares each ﬁrm’s short interest to that of other ﬁrms each month where ﬁrms are matched
with high, medium and low partitions of ﬁrms by employing ﬁve
matching factors (size, book-to-market, momentum, turnover, and
institutional ownership). Prior studies have conﬁrmed that these
ﬁve factors are associated with short sellers’ positioning. For the
ﬁrst stage’s ﬁtting of ABSI, however, the regression speciﬁcation
also includes four of those matching factors (size, book-to-market,

β0 + β1 Befeai,t + β2 Befeai,t x delists + β3 Afteai,t
+ β4 Afteai,t x delists + β5 Bank capitali,t−1 + β6 Non
− performing loansi,t−1 + β7 Bank Z − scorei,t−1
+ β8 Bank liquidityi,t−1 + β9 Log(Size )i,t−1
+β10 Book − to − marketi,t−1 + β11 Momentuμi,t−1
+β12 Turnoveri,t−1 + μi,t
(1)
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ables therefore creates “baseline” estimations for non-EA ﬁrm ABSI
(i.e., ﬁrms that do not have a Befea period or an Aftea period17 ).
All interpretations can therefore be compared to contemporaneous
baseline (non-EA) ABSIs and related subsequent returns. Note that
the ﬁrst stage uses the indicator variable and interactions to enable an investigation of hypothesized structural differences in ABSI
levels (intercept ﬁxed effects) in the linear ﬁtting of observed ABSI.
The second stage, however, uses those same indicator variables not
only to enable an investigation of hypothesized structural differences in return levels (intercept ﬁxed effects), but also of hypothesized structural differences in return correlations (slopes in expected ABSI) in the linear ﬁtting of observed returns before and
after EA announcements.
Table 2 presents OLS estimates for the ﬁrst stage regression in
column (A). For comparison column (B) reports results estimation
of the model when indicator variables are excluded. It is worth
noting that for both estimations the coeﬃcient estimates for bank
capital, non-performing loans, and bank liquidity are signiﬁcant at
conventional levels, and that the signs are as expected if the ABSI
metric is systematically higher for ﬁrms with weak bank fundamental information. These results conﬁrm that heightened short
positions are associated with weak bank fundamental information
regardless whether the ﬁrm ever receives or operates with an EA.
The exception is for bank Z-score, whose coeﬃcient estimate has
the opposite sign from expected. Table 2 Columns (C) and (D)
presents OLS estimates for the second stage regression with and
without the indicator variables and interactions.18 We now turn to
hypothesis tests.
4.3.1. Is pre-EA short positioning abnormally high (H1)?
Table 3 Panel A uses estimates from Table 2 Column (A) to
test H1’s conjecture of abnormally high pre-EA short positioning.
The ﬁrst-stage estimation provides two related estimations of differences from non-EA ﬁrms’ baseline ABSI. As shown in the “Full
sample” Column, we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcantly lower ABSI (than baseline non-EA ﬁrms) for survivors (-0.130) and a signiﬁcantly higher
ABSI for eventual delisters (0.382∗∗∗ ). The ABSI for delisters equals
the sum of estimates for Befea and Befea x delists, with signiﬁcance determined by Wald tests. As borrowing shares to short is
not uniformly frictionless, Table 3’s other columns consider subsamples likely varying in their appeal to short sellers due to those
frictions. “Price ≥ $1/share” excludes so-called “penny stock” observations when the month’s stock price is less than one dollar per
share. “Average daily volume ≥ $50 0 0” excludes ﬁrms with very
low average daily trading volume (ADV) that could prove diﬃcult
to short.19 “Size ≥ $50 M” focuses on ﬁrms above the 25th percentile of our sample’s market caps (at $48.3 million) presumed
to have suﬃcient market cap to represent (for short sellers) large
potential dollar proﬁt opportunities rather than just large negative
returns on small dollar positions. Employing Balasubramnian and
Palvia’s (2018) cutoff, ﬁrms having “Assets < $50 B” are likely not
“To Big To Fail” (TBTF). They are therefore likely to be free of damp-

Fig. 3. Event time of EAs and buy-and-hold returns. This ﬁgure shows means of
abnormal buy-and-hold returns BHAR[-12,t] (upper panel) and short interest ratio
ABSI[t] (middle panel) versus event month “t” where EA initiation is event month
“0”. Means are for the full sample of ﬁrms and whether initiation is in the crisis
or non-crisis period. The bottom panel shows by event month the number of ﬁrms
that delist during the ﬁrst 12 months the ﬁrm operates with the EA.

momentum and turnover) as continuous control variables due to
their possible explanatory power for ABSI over time. Institutional
ownership, however, is excluded as a continuous control variable
in both stages due to its high correlation with Log(Size).
Importantly for our analyses, the matching-partition-oriented
metric ABSI is not structured to reﬂect important ancillary public
fundamental bank information, such as found in quarterly ﬁnancial
ﬁlings that may also predict short seller positioning. For example,
weak bank fundamental information – speciﬁcally, low bank capital ratios, high non-performing loan ratios, low bank Z-scores, and
low bank liquidity – are associated with a higher likelihood of the
distress that leads to receiving an EA (Deli et al., 2019). Our ﬁrststage ﬁtting of ABSI adds these observables as control variables because banking ﬁrm short selling is expected to be associated with
these variables even when a ﬁrm never receives an EA. The second stage regression is a traditional asset pricing examination that
seeks to relate returns to the usual factors of size, book-to-market
and momentum, but also to expected ABSI.
In order to investigate the hypothesized structural breaks, both
stages of the regression speciﬁcation employ indicator variables to
distinguish observation months: (i) in the 12 months preceding an
EA (Befeai,t ); (ii) in the 12 months (inclusive of initiation month)
of an EA (Afteai,t ); and for ﬁrms that eventually delist while operating with an EA (delists).16 The structure of the indicator vari-

ﬁrst 12 months of operating with an EA, including the initiation month. At the earlier of the ﬁrm’s delisting or the completion of that 12 months following the EA, the
ﬁrm no longer contributes observations. As we will be considering crisis and noncrisis subsamples, we include 2013 because it is clearly a non-crisis year and this
allows us to follow ﬁrms with EA initiations during 2012. We exclude 2006 because
it is unclear whether this is a crisis or non-crisis year. Desai et al., (2016) ﬁnd that
short sellers may have forecast ﬁnancial distress by 2006. Given that some ﬁrms
were “treated” in all of their contributed observations, we have omitted ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects which would confound identifying treatment effects.
17
Some non-EA ﬁrms delist during 2007 – 2013, but they never operate with an
EA. We include them in the sample until they delist.
18
Modifying returns to be measured in excess of market returns leads to all of
the same basic inferences.
19
We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

16
That is, Befea equals 1 only when the ﬁrm receives an EA in one of the following 12 months and zero otherwise. Aftea equals 1 only when a ﬁrm is in one of its
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Table 2
OLS estimates for the ﬁrst and second stage regressions for 2007 to 2013.

Dependent Variable:
Row
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)

Independent Variable
ABSIh
Befea
Befea x delists
Befea x ABSIh
Befea x delists x ABSIh
Aftea x ABSIh
Aftea x delists x ABSIh
Aftea
Aftea x delists
Bank capital
Non-performing loans
Bank Z-score
Bank liquidity
Log(Size)
Book-to-market
Momentum
Turnover
Constant
N
R-squared

(A)
First Stage (Fitting ABSI)

(B)

(C)
(D)
Second Stage (Allocation Skill)

ABSI

ABSI

Return

Return

-0.416 (0.000)
-3.742 (0.000)
-6.463 (0.000)
-0.836 (0.055)
0.583 (0.425)
-0.224 (0.505)
0.239 (0.689)
-1.536 (0.003)
-6.091 (0.000)

-0.130 (0.179)
0.512 ∗∗∗ (0.002)

-0.488 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.314 (0.118)
-4.233 (0.000) ∗∗∗
17.641 0.000 ∗∗∗
0.007 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-5.419 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.555 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.492 (0.000) ∗∗∗
0.079 (0.155)
10.284 (0.000) ∗∗∗
2.948 (0.000) ∗∗∗
31,187
0.143

-3.813 (0.000) ∗∗∗
15.867 (0.000) ∗∗∗
0.007 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-5.744 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.55 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.485 (0.000) ∗∗∗
0.079 (0.148)
10.211 (0.000) ∗∗∗
2.914 (0.000) ∗∗∗
31,187
0.143

0.082 (0.099)
1.976 (0.000)
2.358 (0.000)

∗∗∗

-0.780 (0.000)

∗∗∗
∗

∗∗∗
∗∗∗

∗

0.132 (0.010)
1.369 (0.000)
3.164 (0.000)

∗∗∗
∗∗∗

-2.617 (0.000)
31,187
0.036

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗

-2.602 (0.000)
31,187
0.016

∗∗∗

Table 2 presents OLS estimates for the ﬁrst stage regression (Eq. 1) in column (A) and second stage regression (Eq. 2) in column (C) as given in Section 4.3.
Firm-month observations are for all 628 banking ﬁrms during 2007 to 2013 irrespective of whether the ﬁrms experience an EA. Independent variable ABSIh in
the second stage is the ﬁtted (without the ﬁrst-stage error term) abnormal short interest from the ﬁrst stage. Indicator variables and cross terms in rows (2)
through (9) distinguish event observation months for 180 ﬁrms that experience an EA in the 12 months preceding an EA (Befea) and in the ﬁrst 12 months
(inclusive of initiation month) operating with an EA (Aftea), and for ﬁrms that eventually delist while operating with an EA (delists). Control variables in rows
(10) through (17) are as deﬁned in Table 1 panel (B). Section 4.3 provides the model’s further details. For comparison columns (B) and (D) report results for
estimation of the model when indicator variables are excluded. Robust p-values are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively, for two-sided t-tests of coeﬃcient estimates.
Table 3
Tests of hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4 for 2007 to 2013.
Full sample
Row
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Row
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

Price ≥ $1/share

ADV ≥ $50 0 0

Panel A: Examination of H1 (Abnormal Short Positioning Preceding EAs)
Befea
-0.130
-0.092
-0.143
0.513 ∗∗∗
0.693 ∗∗∗
Befea x delists
0.512 ∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
Befea + Befea x delists
0.382
0.421
0.550 ∗∗∗
Panel B: Examination of H2 (Cross-Sectional Allocation Skill Prior to EAs)
-0.398 ∗∗∗
-0.373 ∗∗∗
ABSIh
-0.416 ∗∗∗
Befea x ABSIh
-0.836 ∗
-1.280 ∗∗∗
-0.687 ∗
-1.678 ∗∗∗
-1.060 ∗∗∗
ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh
-1.252 ∗∗∗
Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh
-0.253
-0.272
-0.224
ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh
-0.669
-0.670
-0.597
Panel C: Examination of H3 (Abnormal Short Positioning Following EA Announcements)
-0.561 ∗∗∗
-0.531 ∗∗∗
Aftea
-0.488 ∗∗∗
Aftea x delists
-0.314
0.252
-0.028
Aftea + Aftea x delists
-0.802 ∗∗∗
-0.308
-0.559 ∗∗
Aftea - Befea
-0.358 ∗∗∗
-0.468 ∗∗∗
-0.388
Aftea + Aftea x delists – (Befea + Befea x delists)
-1.184 ∗∗∗
-0.729 ∗∗∗
-1.109 ∗∗∗
∗∗∗
-0.261
-0.721 ∗∗
Difference
-0.826
Panel D: Examination of H4 (Cross-Sectional Allocation Skill Following EA Announcements)
Aftea x ABSIh
-0.224
-0.368
-0.148
ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh
-0.640 ∗
-0.766 ∗∗
-0.512 ∗
Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh
0.015
-0.811
-0.045
ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh
-0.401
-1.209 ∗∗
-0.418

Size ≥ $50 M

Assets < $50 B

-0.436 ∗∗∗
2.415 ∗∗∗
1.979 ∗∗∗

0.205
0.114
0.319

-0.321
-1.069
-1.390
-1.131
-1.452

∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗

∗

-1.237 ∗∗∗
3.591 ∗∗∗
2.354 ∗∗∗
-0.801 ∗∗∗
0.375
1.176
-0.732
-1.053
-2.193
-2.514

∗
∗∗∗
∗
∗∗

∗

∗∗

-0.407
-0.449
-0.856
-0.333
-0.740

∗∗∗

-0.196
-0.423
-0.619
-0.401
-0.938
-0.537

∗

-0.324
-0.731
-0.258
-0.665

∗

∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗

∗

"Sweet spot"
0.029
1.673
1.702

∗∗∗
∗∗∗

-0.354
-0.736
-1.090
-0.924
-1.278

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

∗∗

-0.991 ∗∗∗
3.210 ∗∗∗
2.220 ∗∗∗
-1.020 ∗∗∗
0.517
1.537 ∗∗
-0.970
-1.324
-2.247
-2.601

∗
∗∗
∗∗
∗∗

Panels A through D report relevant comparisons of coeﬃcient estimates using the OLS regressions (as in Table 2) for 2007 to 2013 for testing hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and
H4. Section 4.3 provides a discussion of each hypothesis and connections to table rows. Columns report estimates for the full sample (as in Table 2) as well as for the
following subsamples: stock price of at least $1/share, average daily trading volume (“ADV”) of at least $50 0 0, market cap (“Size”) of at least $50 million, and total assets
of at least $50 billion. The “Sweet spot” subsample consists of ﬁrms with market cap of at least $50 million and with total assets of at least $50 billion. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗
indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-sided Wald tests.

ened short seller interest due to anticipation of government intervention forestalling future losses in TBTF banks.20 Finally, we use
the combination “Assets < $50 B & Size > $50 M as a likely short
seller “Sweet spot” of banking ﬁrms offering short sellers suﬃcient

dollar proﬁt opportunities while not being TBTF. Subsample restrictions are applied to all ﬁrms regardless of whether they ever receive an EA.
Table 3 Row (1) displays subsample coeﬃcient estimates for Befea for ﬁrms that survive EAs (survivors) and Table 4 Row (3) displays the analogous subsample coeﬃcient estimate sums for ﬁrms
that delist while operating under an EA (delisters). Accordingly,

20
While just one of our TBTF banking ﬁrms (Wachovia) operated with EAs in the
crisis period, seven received EAs in the non-crisis period.
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Table 4
Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimates for the crisis and non-crisis periods.

Row

Dependent Variable:
Independent Variable

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)

ABSIh
Befea
Befea x delists
Befea x ABSIh
Befea x delists x ABSIh
Aftea
Aftea x delists
Aftea x ABSIh
Aftea x delists x ABSIh
Bank capital
Non-performing loans
Bank Z-score
Bank liquidity
Log(Size)
Book-to-market
Momentum
Turnover
Constant
N
R-squared

(A)
(B)
First Stage (Fitting ABSI)

(C)

(D)
(E)
Second Stage (Allocation Skill)

(F)

ABSI
Crisis

ABSI
Non-crisis

ABSI
Crisis – Non-crisis

Return
Crisis

Return
Crisis – Non-crisis

0.193 (0.181)
0.608 (0.004)

-0.451 (0.001)
-0.887 (0.000)

∗∗∗

-0.860 (0.001)
0.536 (0.125)

∗∗∗

-3.731 (0.000) ∗∗∗
20.025 (0.000) ∗∗∗
0.006 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-9.09 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.713 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.504 (0.000) ∗∗∗
0.478 (0.000) ∗∗∗
12.284 (0.000) ∗∗∗
3.65 (0.000) ∗∗∗
14,792
0.181

-0.448 (0.000)
-1.023 (0.000)

∗∗∗
∗∗∗

∗∗∗
∗∗∗

-7.95 (0.000) ∗∗∗
17.254 (0.000) ∗∗∗
0.011 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-3.163 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.447 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.598 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.213 -0.007 ∗∗∗
7.974 (0.000) ∗∗∗
3.187 (0.000) ∗∗∗
16,395
0.123

0.644 (0.001)
1.495 (0.000)

∗∗∗
∗∗∗

-0.412 (0.150)
1.559 (0.000) ∗∗∗

4.219 (0.000) ∗∗∗
2.771 (0.123)
-0.005 (0.001) ∗∗∗
-5.927 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.266 (0.000) ∗∗∗
0.094 (0.156)
0.691 (0.000) ∗∗∗
4.31 (0.000) ∗∗∗
0.463 (0.039) ∗∗

Return
Non-crisis

-0.107 (0.353)
-2.913 (0.002)
-7.264 (0.000)
-1.172 (0.101)
1.164 (0.204)
-1.418 (0.406)
-6.032 (0.012)
0.041 (0.966)
-0.513 (0.654)

0.149 (0.051)
1.742 (0.000)
0.9 (0.098) ∗

∗∗∗
∗∗∗

∗∗

∗
∗∗∗

-4.163 (0.000)
14,792
0.027

∗∗∗

-0.669 (0.000)
-4.728 (0.000)
-7.656 (0.000)
-0.957 (0.096)
-2.393 (0.067)
-2.615 (0.000)
-5.651 (0.002)
-0.346 (0.382)
0.496 (0.585)

∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗
∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗

0.562 (0.001) ∗∗∗
1.815 (0.115)
0.392 (0.869)
-0.215 (0.815)
3.557 (0.026) ∗∗
1.197 (0.503)
-0.381 (0.900)
0.387 (0.707)
-1.009 (0.490)

-0.083 (0.184)
1.309 (0.000) ∗∗∗
-0.298 (0.471)

0.232 (0.019)∗ ∗
0.433 (0.197)
1.198 (0.079) ∗

0.569 (0.305)
16,395
0.036

-4.732 (0.000)

∗∗∗

Table 4 presents estimates for the ﬁrst stage regression (Eq. 1) in columns (A) and (B) and second stage regression (Eq. 2) in columns (D) and (E) using a Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) approach for estimating the two-stage regression model in the crisis (20 07 – 20 09) and non-crisis (2010 – 2013) periods. Variables are
as described in Table 2. Columns (C) and (F) report the difference in estimates (Crisis – Non-crisis). Section 4.4 provides further discussion. Robust p-values are in
parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-sided t-tests of coeﬃcient estimates in columns (A), (B), (D), and (E),
and for two-sided Wald tests in columns (C) and (F).

Row (2) presents the increase from survivor to delister. Not surprisingly given that they survive, Row (1)’s estimates indicate that
truly abnormal (beyond comparable non-EA ﬁrms) pre-EA short
positioning in eventual survivors is mixed across subsamples and
indicates a level generally insigniﬁcantly different from positioning
in comparable non-EA ﬁrms. However, Row (3)’s estimates indicate
pre-EA short positioning in eventual delisters while operating with
an EA that is robustly and uniformly higher than the baseline for
comparable non-EA ﬁrms, and particularly so for ﬁrms with sufﬁcient market cap to offer signiﬁcant dollar proﬁt opportunities
(1.979∗∗∗ ). Row (2) conﬁrms that the increased positioning in delisters compared to survivors is robustly signiﬁcant. We conclude that
H1’s general conjecture of abnormally high pre-EA positioning by
short sellers is strongly supported although it is generally driven
by positioning in delisters rather than survivors.

ABSIh and the coeﬃcient for the interaction effect speciﬁc to the
pre-EA period: Befea x ABSIh. The sum of the two provides the total estimated negative (slope) relationship between ﬁtted ABSI and
subsequent return for EA ﬁrms in their pre-EA periods while taking into account other observable explanatory factors. Although not
directly hypothesized in H2, the second-stage speciﬁcation also allows us to consider the coeﬃcient for Befea x ABSIh in isolation to
examine if short sellers appear even more skilled in emphasizing
big losers and/or deemphasizing others in the subset of ﬁrms that
subsequently experience an EA.
Table 2 Column (D) reports the relevant second stage regression
estimations in the absence of the indicators variables and interactions. As anticipated given prior ﬁndings regarding short seller
skill, baseline coeﬃcient estimates for ABSIh (in non-EA ﬁrms)
are signiﬁcantly negative (-0.780∗∗∗ ). In Column (C)’s focal secondstage regressions (that include the indicators and interactions),
they are as well (-0.416∗∗∗ ). These baseline estimates strongly suggest that short sellers exhibit cross-sectional allocation talent as a
norm even when considering only ﬁrms that never receive an EA.
Turning to Table 3 Panel B, we examine H2’s hypothesis of a
negative relationship for ﬁrms subsequently experiencing an EA.
The estimates suggest multiple insights. For eventual survivors,
Table 3 Panel B Row (6) displays a consistently negative relationship in pre-EA periods (e.g., Full Sample -1.252∗∗∗ ). Row (5) conﬁrms a robust signiﬁcantly negative incremental slope in the preEA (Befea) period (e.g., Full sample -0.836∗ ). For delisting ﬁrms,
Table 3 Panel B Row (8) displays a fairly consistent insigniﬁcantly
negative total slope (e.g., Full sample -0.669). Row (7)’s coeﬃcients
suggest that these slopes appear to be more negative than the already signiﬁcantly negative slope for the baseline non-EA ﬁrms
(e.g., Full Sample -0.669 is more negative by -0.253 than -0.416∗∗∗ ).
However, covariation in the reduced sample size of delisting ﬁrms
“robs” the apparently more negative coeﬃcient of its signiﬁcance.
Additionally, we cannot reject that the slopes are the same across
the non-EA baseline and delisting ﬁrms in the pre-EA period (e.g.,
in Full sample 0.253 is not signiﬁcant). Summarizing Table 3 Panel
B’s pre-EA evidence on skill, in our sample, banking ﬁrm short sell-

4.3.2. Does pre-EA short positioning reﬂect cross-sectional allocation
skill (H2)?
Hypothesis H2 suggests that in the months preceding EA initiations, the ﬁrm’s abnormal short interest is negatively related
to subsequent returns. The general notion of short seller expertise suggests that abnormal short selling and subsequent returns
should be negatively related even for ﬁrms that never receive an
EA (non-EA ﬁrms).21 Skill in short selling should not only exhibit
as picking ﬁrms that subsequently struggle beyond the level priced
into the stock, but also should exhibit as taking larger (smaller) positions in ﬁrms that experience larger (smaller) subsequent negative, or even positive, returns. Short seller expertise leads to our
anticipation that the second-stage coeﬃcient estimate for ABSIh
should generally be negative (the larger the position the more negative the subsequent return). The coeﬃcient estimate of interest
for testing H2 as stated is the sum of that base coeﬃcient for
21
Note, however, that conditioning the baseline skill level on lack of a future EA
biases this baseline down since it eliminates ﬁrms that will receive an EA. That is,
short seller skill in general is at least as high in general as it is in the sample of
ﬁrms that never experience the generally-negative event of receiving an EA.
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ers exhibit signiﬁcant baseline (non-EA), and signiﬁcant (insignificant) additional speciﬁc pre-EA expertise in survivors (delisters)
through greater abnormal positioning in big losers and/or lesser
abnormal positioning in ﬁrms that lose less or even gain. In contrast to the delister drivers for pre-EA positioning as hypothesized
in H1, here we have survivor drivers for pre-EA skill as hypothesized in H2. Overall, our sample exhibits strong and subsample
robust evidence of pre-EA short seller expertise as hypothesized in
H2.

suﬃcient remaining market cap to attract additional short seller
scrutiny, but is not TBTF (Row (18)’s 2.601∗∗ ). Regarding potential
beyond-baseline skill, however, there is no signiﬁcant evidence of
greater-than-baseline skill in short seller post-announcement allocations across delisters other than for ﬁrms with suﬃciently large
remaining market cap (Row (17)’s Size ≥ $50 M at -2.193∗ ). As expected, the evidence is greatest when the ﬁrm is also TBTF (Row
(17)’s Assets < $50 B & Size ≥ $50 M at 2.247∗∗ ). On balance,
other than for the Size ≥ $50 M and “Sweet spot” subsamples
where additional short seller investment may be warranted, EA announcements appear to provide substantive information homogenization and incent proﬁt taking. For delisters, the resulting diminished opportunities for proﬁts places short sellers in a context fostering a similar level of cross-sectional allocation skill as that found
for non-EA ﬁrms. Summarizing our post-announcement results, we
ﬁnd robust evidence of short seller skill for survivors regardless of
subsample, but only for large remaining market cap delisters.

4.3.3. Is short positioning following EA announcements abnormally
high (H3)?
H3’s hypotheses deal with short seller positioning levels subsequent to the announcement of an EA under the notion that EA
announcements act as information-homogenizing events that incent short seller proﬁt taking. Table 3 Panel C indicates that short
positioning following an EA is signiﬁcantly less than baseline for
survivors (e.g., Full sample -0.488∗∗∗ ) and delisters (e.g., Full sample -0.802∗∗∗ ). With respect to the speciﬁc hypothesis regarding
positioning adjustments following EA announcements, consistent
with H3Survives , Table 3 Panel C Row (12) conﬁrms the tendency for
survivor ﬁrm short positioning to decrease in response to the EA
(e.g., Full sample -0.358∗∗∗ ). Regarding H3Delists , Row (13) displays
an even greater tendency to decrease for delisters (e.g., Full sample -1.184∗∗∗ representing an additional decrease at -0.826∗∗∗ ). This
greater proﬁt-taking decrease in short seller positioning for eventual delisters appears in all subsamples other than those containing suﬃcient market cap to represent signiﬁcant remaining dollar proﬁt opportunities for short sellers. For Size ≥ $50 M, delisters who are already experiencing signiﬁcantly higher positioning prior to the EA announcement (Table 3 Panel A Row (3)’s
1.979∗∗∗ ) experience a post-announcement increase (Table 3 Panel
C Row (13)’s 0.375). The result is a continuation of, or possibly
even increase in, the signiﬁcantly higher-than-baseline positioning.
(Panel C Row (11)’s 2.354∗∗∗ = Panel A Row (1)’s 1.979∗∗∗ + Panel
C Row (14)’s 0.375). Not surprisingly, this increase of 0.375 appears to differ from the post-announcement decrease experienced
by survivors (Table 3 Panel C Row (12)). To recap, our sample conﬁrms H3’s basic hypothesis about (lower than comparable nonEA) short positioning in EA ﬁrms following the announcement of
EAs and conﬁrms H3Survives ’s speciﬁc decrease in short positioning follow the announcement. It also veriﬁes H3Delists ’s ambiguity
regarding short positioning changes subsequent to EA announcements for delisters due to the subset of those that have suﬃcient
post-announcement market cap to sustain existing, or even attract
additional, short seller scrutiny and positioning. For that suﬃcient
post-announcement market cap subset of delisters, the EA precedes, and may even appear to attract, additional abnormal short
positioning that results in a level signiﬁcantly exceeding that in
comparable non-EA ﬁrms.

4.4. Investigating structural differences in a ﬁnancial crisis
In order to examine whether prior full-sample results adequately describe both times of crisis and non-crisis, we engage
a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) approach for estimating
the two-stage regression model in the crisis and non-crisis periods. Due to the proliferation of banking ﬁrm ﬁnancial distress during a global ﬁnancial crisis, we expect that short sellers will face
increased pressure to take proﬁts after an EA and reallocate their
ﬁnancial and human capital towards prospecting for more pre-EA
ﬁrms. That is, we expect that the crisis will result is more preEA positioning and less following EAs. We would also expect that
conditioning on a crisis decreases short seller proﬁtability and may
attenuate the usual negative relationship between positioning and
subsequent return.
4.4.1. I abnormal short interest higher during a ﬁnancial crisis
(H1Crisis )?
Regarding background for H1Crisis , Table 4 Column (C) Row
(18)’s 0.463∗∗ conﬁrms that in our SUR estimation the crisis subsample reﬂects the expected positive crisis ﬁxed effect, i.e., the regression line starts from a higher intercept level of ABSI. While
a positive crisis ﬁxed effect reﬂects H1 in a general sense as a
starting point for all ﬁrms, incremental EA-related positioning beyond contemporaneous comparable non-EA ﬁrm baselines is our
main concern. Due to contemporaneous comparable ﬁrm baselining, a given level of positive (negative) ABSI would be less (more)
likely to be ﬂagged as “truly abnormal” – i.e., above (below) comparable ﬁrm levels in the same period – in crisis rather than noncrisis. In line with this tendency, Column (A) conﬁrms for survivors
the presence of insigniﬁcant above-higher-crisis-period-baseline
pre-EA short positioning during Crisis (Row (2)’s 0.193). Column
(B) conﬁrms for survivors signiﬁcantly less-than-lower-non-crisisperiod-baseline pre-EA positioning during Non-crisis (Row (2)’s 0.451∗∗∗ ). Regarding a direct examination of baseline-adapted H1,
the difference (Colum (C) Row (2)’s +0.644∗∗∗ ) conﬁrms H1Crisis
as applied to surviving ﬁrms, i.e., greater truly abnormal (i.e., expected ABSI) pre-EA positioning (beyond period-comparable baselines) in surviving ﬁrms in a ﬁnancial crisis. Table 5 Panel A Row
(3) displays subsample robustness for this difference characterization other than for penny and low volume stocks. (Those stocks
drive the -0.113 for Assets < $50 B because the difference characterization still holds for Price ≥ $1/share and for ADV ≥ 50 0 0.)
Regarding background for H1Crisis as applied to delisting ﬁrms,
Table 5 Panel A Row (4) conﬁrms signiﬁcantly greater-thanbaseline pre-EA short positioning (e.g., Full sample 0.801∗∗∗ ) in
Crisis, but signiﬁcantly less-than-baseline pre-EA short positioning
(e.g., Full sample -1.338∗∗∗ ) in Non-crisis. More to the point, the

4.3.4. Does post-EA-announcement positioning reﬂect allocation skill
(H4)?
The H4 hypothesis addresses talent-related correlation between
short seller positioning after EA announcements and subsequent
returns. Table 3 Panel D veriﬁes the presence of H4’s hypothesized short seller skill after EA announcements for survivors (e.g.,
Row (16)’s Full sample -0.640∗ = -0.416∗∗∗ - 0.224). Additionally,
there is some suggestion, that for survivors, short sellers exhibit
greater-than-baseline cross-sectional allocation skills after EA announcements (Row (15)), presumably from avoiding big survivor
rebounds after EAs. For H4 for delisters the conjectured skill appears in all subsamples (Row (18)), and is signiﬁcant for those with
suﬃciently high price (Price ≥ $1/share at 1.209∗∗ ) or market cap
(e.g. Size ≥ $50 M at -2.514∗∗ ). Support for H4 in delisters appears strongest in the short seller “Sweet spot” where a ﬁrm has
10

L. Boni, J.C. Leach and R.S. White

Journal of Banking and Finance 132 (2021) 106235

Table 5
Tests of hypotheses H1Crisis and H2Crisis .
Full sample
Row
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Row
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

Price ≥ $1/share

ADV ≥ $50 0 0

Panel A: Examination of H1Crisis (Pre-EA Abnormal Short Positioning Higher During Crisis)
Crisis: Befea
0.193
0.233
0.153
-0.422 ∗∗∗
-0.468 ∗∗∗
Non-crisis: Befea
-0.451 ∗∗∗
0.655 ∗∗∗
0.621 ∗∗∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
0.644 ∗∗∗
0.812 ∗∗∗
0.918 ∗∗∗
Crisis: Befea + Befea x delists
0.801 ∗∗∗
Non-crisis: Befea + Befea x delists
-1.338 ∗∗∗
-1.200 ∗∗∗
-1.496 ∗∗∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
2.139 ∗∗∗
2.012 ∗∗∗
2.414 ∗∗∗
Panel B: Examination of H2Crisis (Pre-EA Cross-Sectional Allocation Skill Attenuates During Crisis)
-1.736 ∗∗
-0.996
Crisis: ABSIh +Befea x ABSIh
-1.279 ∗
-1.932 ∗∗∗
-1.447 ∗∗∗
Non-crisis: ABSIh +Befea x ABSIh
-1.626 ∗∗∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
0.347
0.196
0.451
Crisis: ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh
-0.115
-0.284
-0.107
Non-crisis: ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh -4.019∗∗∗
-3.437 ∗∗∗
-3.684 ∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
3.904
3.153
3.577 ∗∗∗
Crisis: Befea x ABSIh
-1.172
-1.629 ∗∗
-0.928
-1.259 ∗∗
-0.832
Non-crisis: Befea x ABSIh
-0.957 ∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
-0.215
-0.370
-0.096
Crisis: Befea x ABSIh +Befea x delists x ABSIh
-0.008
-0.177
-0.039
-2.764 ∗∗
-3.069 ∗∗∗
Non-crisis: Befea x ABSIh +Befea x delists x ABSIh
-3.350 ∗∗∗
∗∗
∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
3.342
2.587
3.030 ∗∗

Size ≥ $50 M

Assets < $50 B

"Sweet spot"

0.099
-1.195 ∗∗∗
1.294 ∗∗∗
2.145 ∗∗∗
-2.348 ∗∗∗
4.493 ∗∗∗

0.146
0.259 ∗∗
-0.113
0.615 ∗∗∗
-1.079 ∗∗∗
1.693 ∗∗∗

0.027
-0.113
0.140
1.805 ∗∗∗
-2.337 ∗∗∗
4.142 ∗∗∗

-1.484 ∗∗
-1.447 ∗∗
-0.037
-1.159 ∗
-5.045 ∗∗∗
3.886 ∗∗
-1.477 ∗∗
-0.994 ∗
-0.483
-1.152
-4.592 ∗∗∗
3.440 ∗∗

-1.101
-1.017
-0.084
-0.333
-4.285 ∗∗∗
3.952 ∗∗∗
-0.976
-0.377
-0.599
-0.208
-3.645 ∗∗∗
3.437 ∗∗∗

-1.166
-1.186
0.020
-1.010 ∗
-4.930 ∗∗∗
3.920 ∗∗∗
-1.069
-0.772
-0.297
-0.913
-4.516 ∗∗∗
3.603 ∗∗∗

Panels A and B report relevant comparisons of coeﬃcient estimates using the SUR regression results (as in Table 4) for the crisis (2007 – 2009) and non-crisis (2010 –
2013) periods for testing hypotheses H1Crisis and H2Crisis . Section 4.4 provides a discussion of related hypotheses and connections to table rows. Columns report estimates
for the full sample (as in Table 4) as well as for the following subsamples: stock price of at least $1/share, average daily trading volume (“ADV”) of at least $50 0 0, market
cap (“Size”) of at least $50 million, and total assets of at least $50 billion. The “Sweet spot” subsample consists of ﬁrms with market cap of at least $50 million and with
total assets of at least $50 billion. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-sided Wald tests.

difference (2.139∗∗∗ ) conﬁrms H1Crisis as applied to delisting ﬁrms,
i.e., greater truly abnormal pre-EA positioning in delisting ﬁrms in
a ﬁnancial crisis.
Table 5 Panel A Rows (3) and (6) provide strong evidence for
H1Crisis ’s conjecture of higher truly abnormal pre-EA positioning
in a crisis except for TBTF survivors. As in earlier estimations that
did not separate the observations into crisis and non-crisis periods,
there is clear evidence that the higher truly abnormal pre-EA positioning is driven by positioning in ﬁrms that delist following an EA
more so than those that survive. We interpret this as evidence of
the higher level of short seller activity prior to EAs during a crisis.
Of course, the higher aggregate level could lead to more informative prices prior to the EA that then attenuate pre-EA short seller
proﬁts (e.g., if they all short at the same time in a windfall price
decline).

a lower level of cross-sectional allocation talent. This is possibly
due to: (i) increased crisis-era competition (or perhaps laziness
given baseline returns signiﬁcantly more negative in a crisis anyway); and potentially (ii) more informative prices at which short
sellers position even when there is no subsequent EA. H2Crisis ,
however, is a hypothesis speciﬁcally about lower relative preEA cross-sectional positioning skill during a crisis. For survivors,
Table 5 Panel B Row (7) conﬁrms an apparently lower level of
pre-EA skill (Row (7)’s -1.279∗ ) in Crisis than in Non-crisis (Row
(8)’s -1.626∗∗∗ ). The difference (Row (9)’s 0.347), although insignificant, is in the direction hypothesized in H2Crisis as applied to survivors. However, given that all previous results have pointed to
pre-EA positioning in delisting ﬁrms as the driving force behind
measured pre-EA short seller skill, the potentially more interesting
comparison is for delisters. Table 5 Panel B Row (12) conﬁrms a
robustly lower level of pre-EA skill (e.g., Full sample 3.904∗∗∗ ) for
crisis delisters in the direction hypothesized in H2Crisis . Note that,
although there is variation across subsamples, for the period’s Full
sample, Crisis (Non-crisis) skill is insigniﬁcantly superior (signiﬁcantly superior) to baseline non-EA ﬁrms for survivors (Full Sample -1.172 (Row 13) and -0.957∗ (Row14)) and delisters (Full sample -0.008 (Row (16)) and -3.350∗∗∗ (Row (17)). While there are
pockets of signiﬁcantly beyond-baseline non-EA pre-EA skill in survivors (e.g., Row (14)’s Price ≥ $1/share at 1.259∗∗ Size ≥ $50 M
at -0.994∗ ), once again the greatest beyond-baseline pre-EA skill,
and crisis-related difference in pre-EA skill, appears in allocating
amongst delisting ﬁrms (Rows (17) and (18)). Returning to H2Crisis ,
however, the effect of a crisis in attenuating short sellers’ pre-EA
cross-sectional allocation talent is notable (Rows (9) and (12)) and
driven heavily by diminished crisis-era skill in short sellers’ crosssectional allocation skill amongst delisters (Row (12)).

4.4.2. Does pre-EA allocation skill dissipate during a ﬁnancial crisis
(H2Crisis )?
Our negative slope measure of short seller cross-sectional allocation skill examines short sellers’ abilities to emphasize (deemphasize) big losers (big winners) in the cross section of ﬁrms
shorted. That type of skill (to help recover the costs of investment in expertise) should still be evident, albeit possibly at a reduced level, even when competition among short sellers induces
on-average more informative pre-EA prices. H2Crisis hypothesizes
that, due to increased competition and more informative pre-EA
prices, the negative relationship between abnormal short interest
in EA ﬁrms prior to their EAs and subsequent returns is weaker
during a ﬁnancial crisis.
Table 4 Column (D) Row (1) indicates that the sign of the nonEA baseline relationship is negative in both Crisis (-0.107) and Noncrisis (-0.669∗∗∗ ) periods.22 The signiﬁcant difference from NonCrisis (0.562∗∗∗ ) suggests that the crisis period attracts or induces

4.4.3. Is post-announcement proﬁt-taking greater during a ﬁnancial
crisis (H3Crisis )?
Moving on to short positioning following EA announcements, recall that the additional pressure for proﬁt-taking in a crisis suggests reallocating ﬁnancial and human capital towards prospecting
for pre-EA ﬁrms. In line with that incentive, H3Crisis conjectures
that crisis-era abnormal short interest decreases more from preEA levels. Regarding background for H3Crisis as applied to surviving

22
Note that the crisis and non-crisis intercepts are (as in the ﬁrst stage) significantly different. In particular, Table 4 Row (18)’s signiﬁcantly more negative intercept (-4.732∗ ∗ ∗ ) reﬂects the expected more negative returns starting point (intercept) in a “crisis.” Our hypotheses regarding differential position-return negative
correlations – as proxied by differential slopes in ABSIh – are not directly affected
by the lower returns crisis starting point (intercept).
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Table 6
Tests of hypotheses H3Crisis and H4Crisis .
Full sample
Row
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Row
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)

Price ≥ $1/share

ADV ≥ $50 0 0

Size ≥ $50 M

Panel A: Examination of H3Crisis (Crisis Abnormal Short Positioning Decreases More Following EA Announcements)
-1.367 ∗∗∗
-1.108 ∗∗∗
-2.008 ∗∗∗
Crisis: Aftea - Befea
-1.053 ∗∗∗
Non-crisis: Aftea - Befea
0.003
-0.032
-0.004
0.046
Crisis - Non-crisis
-1.056 ∗∗∗
-1.335 ∗∗∗
-1.105 ∗∗∗
-2.054 ∗∗∗
-0.913 ∗∗
-1.196 ∗∗∗
-0.116
Crisis: Aftea + Aftea x delists - (Befea + Befea x delists)
-1.125 ∗∗∗
0.417
4.075 ∗∗∗
Non-crisis: Aftea + Aftea x delists - (Befea + Befea x delists) -0.133
0.718∗∗
∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
-0.992
-1.631
-1.613
-4.192 ∗∗∗
Crisis: Aftea + Aftea x delists
-0.324
-0.101
-0.277
2.029 ∗∗
Non-crisis: Aftea + Aftea x delists
-1.471 ∗∗∗
-0.482 ∗
-1.079 ∗∗∗
1.727 ∗∗∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
1.147 ∗∗∗
0.381
0.802 ∗
0.301
Panel B: Examination of H4Crisis (Cross-Sectional Allocation Skill Following EA Announcements Attenuates in Crisis)
Crisis: ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh
-0.066
0.064
-0.078
0.443
-1.054 ∗∗
-0.780 ∗∗
-1.504 ∗∗∗
Non-crisis: ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh
-1.015 ∗∗∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
0.949
1.118
0.702
1.947
Crisis: Aftea x ABSIh
0.041
0.171
-0.010
0.450
Non-crisis: Aftea x ABSIh
-0.346
-0.381
-0.165
-1.051 ∗∗
Crisis - Non-crisis
0.387
0.552
0.155
1.501
Crisis: ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh
-0.579
-2.174
-0.327
-1.247
Non-crisis: ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh
-0.519
-1.178
-0.958
14.475
Crisis - Non-crisis
-0.060
-0.996
0.631
-15.722
∗∗∗
-0.472
-2.067
-0.259
-1.240
Crisis: Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh
Non-crisis: Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh
0.150
-0.505
-0.343
14.928
Crisis - Non-crisis
-0.622
-1.562
0.084
-16.168

Assets < $50 B

"Sweet spot"

-0.862 ∗∗∗
-0.303 ∗
-0.560 ∗
-0.976 ∗∗∗
0.031
-1.007 ∗∗
-0.361
-1.048 ∗∗∗
0.687 ∗∗

-1.564 ∗∗∗
-0.580 ∗
-0.984
-0.139
4.437 ∗∗∗
-4.576 ∗∗∗
1.666 ∗∗
2.100 ∗∗∗
-0.434

-0.195
-1.122
0.927
-0.070
-0.482
0.412
-0.736
-0.780
0.044
-0.611
-0.140
-0.471

0.333
-1.862 ∗∗∗
2.195 ∗∗
0.430
-1.448 ∗∗
1.878 ∗
-1.134
20.498
-21.632
-1.037
20.912
-21.949

∗∗

Panels A and B report relevant comparisons of coeﬃcient estimates using the SUR regression results (as in Table 4) for the crisis (2007 – 2009) and non-crisis (2010 –
2013) periods for testing hypotheses H3Crisis and H4Crisis . Section 4.4 provides a discussion of related hypotheses and connections to table rows. Columns report estimates
for the full sample (as in Table 4) as well as for the following subsamples: stock price of at least $1/share, average daily trading volume (“ADV”) of at least $50 0 0, market
cap (“Size”) of at least $50 million, and total assets of at least $50 billion. The “Sweet spot” subsample consists of ﬁrms with market cap of at least $50 million and with
total assets of at least $50 billion. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-sided Wald tests.

ﬁrms, Table 6 Panel A Row (1) conﬁrms robustly signiﬁcant declines in abnormal short positioning during a crisis. However, Row
(2) indicates the absence of a similarly robust decline during noncrisis times for survivors. The signiﬁcant additional decline during
crisis (Row 3) conﬁrms H3Crisis for surviving ﬁrms.
Regarding H3Crisis as applied to delisting ﬁrms, Table 6 Panel A
Row (4) conﬁrms a robust signiﬁcant decline in abnormal short
positioning during a crisis. In stark contrast, Row (5) not only reﬂects an absence of a similar decline, but signiﬁcantly increased
post-announcement positioning in non-crisis delisting ﬁrms having suﬃcient remaining post-announcement market cap (e.g., Row
(5)’s 4.075∗∗∗ for Size ≥ $50 M). Regarding H3Crisis ’s speciﬁcally hypothesized difference, Row (6)’s signiﬁcant additional declines during crisis (Full sample at -0.992∗∗ and negative and signiﬁcant for
all subsamples) conﬁrm H3Crisis even for delisting ﬁrms. In summary, consistent with additional pressure for crisis-related proﬁt
taking to redeploy ﬁnancial and human capital towards prospecting for pre-EA ﬁrms, both surviving and delisting ﬁrms in our sample experience (on average) H3Crisis’ s hypothesized greater decline
in post-announcement short positioning during a ﬁnancial crisis.
Proﬁt-taking is higher during a crisis.
Regarding potentially important EA announcement feedback effects, it is reasonable to conjecture that an EA announcement
could act as a “wake up call” and thereby attract additional short
seller capital and positioning, particularly in ﬁrms that subsequently delist. Table 6 Panel A Row (5)’s positive coeﬃcient estimates (post-announcement increases) are consistent with such a
“wake up call” or “fear of missing out” notion for non-crisis delisters. However, Table 6 Panel A Row (4)’s uniformly negative coefﬁcient estimates (post-announcement decreases) clearly contradict
the notion of similar average post-announcement attraction for crisis delisters – even when post-announcement positioning remains
signiﬁcantly high (Table 6 Panel A Row (7)’s 2.029∗∗ for Size ≥
$50 M and 1.666∗∗ for “Sweet spot”). Perhaps surprisingly, any onaverage “piling on” in response to an EA appears to be a non-crisis,
rather than crisis, concern, and only for delisters. In crisis, for both

delisters and survivors, EAs usually offer short selling pressure relief.
4.4.4. Does post-EA-announcement skill dissipate during a ﬁnancial
crisis (H4Crisis )?
Regarding short sellers’ skill variations during a crisis, H4Crisis
hypothesizes that, due to greater competition during a crisis, there
should be a less negative relationship between abnormal short interest following EA announcements and subsequent returns. As we
highlighted in the discussion of H2Crisis , Table 4 Columns (D) and
(E) Row (1) indicates that the sign of the non-EA baseline relationship is negative in both Crisis (-0.107) and Non-crisis (-0.669∗∗∗ )
periods.23 The signiﬁcant difference from Non-Crisis (0.562∗∗∗ ) suggests that a crisis attracts, or induces, a lower level of crosssectional allocation talent. Degradation in average skill is the expected result of increased crisis-era entry and competition, and of
the more informative prices at which short sellers engage even
when there is no subsequent EA. However, H4Crisis is a hypothesis speciﬁcally about lower relative positioning skill following EA
announcements during crisis rather than non-crisis times. For survivors, Table 6 Panel B Row (10) suggests less skill following EA announcements (e.g., Full sample -0.066) in Crisis than in Non-crisis
(e.g., Row (11)’s -1.015∗∗∗ ), the difference in which (e.g., Row (12)’s
0.949) is consistently in the positive direction hypothesized in
H4Crisis . It is signiﬁcant, however, only in the “Sweet spot” subsample (Row (12)’s 2.195∗∗ ). In both crisis and non-crisis times, short
seller cross-sectional allocation skill in survivors following an EA
announcement tend to be comparable to that in ﬁrms that never
receive an EA. (See Full Sample Row (13)’s 0.041 and Row (14)’s
-0.346 which are both insigniﬁcantly different from zero.). A possible exception is Non-crisis beyond-baseline post-announcement
skill in surviving ﬁrms having suﬃciently enticing remaining post23
We emphasize again that the baseline’s forward-looking conﬁnement to ﬁrms
that never receive an EA biases the baseline negative measure of short seller talent
up towards zero since EAs are generally considered negative events and ﬁrms that
receive them in the future are excluded from this baseline.
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announcement market cap (Table 6 Panel B Row (14)’s -1.051∗∗ for
Size ≥ $50 M and 1.879∗∗ for “Sweet spot”). However, given that
our previous results have highlighted that positioning in delisting
ﬁrms is the driving force behind greater measured short seller skill,
the potentially more interesting comparison is again for delisters.
Table 6 Panel B Rows (16) and (17) display similar overall delister
skill following EA announcements (e.g., Full sample -0.579) in crisis as that in non-crisis times (e.g., Full sample -0.519). Row (18)’s
overall negative differences for crisis delisters (e.g., Full sample 0.060) are insigniﬁcant but also in the opposite of the direction
hypothesized in H4Crisis . We note that, similar to survivors, Rows
(19) and (20) reﬂect no signiﬁcant overall evidence of other-thanbaseline skill in either crisis (Row (19)’s Full sample -0.472) or noncrisis times (Row (20)’s Full sample 0.150). In summary, regarding
H4Crisis’ s conjecture of lower post-announcement cross-sectional
allocation skill during crisis, Table 6 Panel B Row (12) presents
consistently positive differences that align with H4Crisis applied to
survivors, only one of which is signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Table 6 Panel B Row (18) provides no consistent support for, nor
contradiction of, H4Crisis as applied to delisters. The only signiﬁcantly beyond-baseline (truly abnormal) post-announcement skill
is in Non-crisis surviving ﬁrms’ with large remaining market cap
(Table 6 Panel B Row 14’s -1.051∗∗ and -1.448∗∗ ), and for Crisis nonpenny-stock delisting ﬁrms (Table 6 Panel B Row 19’s -2.067∗∗∗ ).
While all subsamples presented in these rows (14 and 19) suggest beyond-baseline post-announcement skill, veriﬁcation of the
signiﬁcance of potentially beyond-baseline skill awaits future more
powerful investigations.

centives to remain positioned. Proﬁt-taking puts upward pressure
on bank stock prices, all else equal. Extending our investigational
approach to the period following the crisis, we document our perhaps otherwise counterintuitive main contribution: EA initiations
attract short selling in non-crisis, rather than crisis, periods. So,
while the possibility that EAs interfere with regulatory intent is a
valid one, the concern appears to be justiﬁed primarily due to the
reaction during non-crisis times.
Supplementary materials
Supplementary material associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2021.106235.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Leslie Boni: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Validation, Visualization, Writing original draft, Writing - review & editing. J. Chris Leach: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Validation, Visualization, Writing - original draft, Writing review & editing. Reilly S. White: Conceptualization, Data curation,
Investigation, Writing - review & editing.
References
Akbas, F., Boehmer, E., Erturk, B., Sorescu, S., 2017. Short interest, returns, and unfavorable fundamental information. Financial Manag. 455–486 Summer.
Balasubramnian, B., Palvia, A., 2018. Can short sellers inform bank supervision? J.
Financial Serv. Res. 53, 69–98.
Berger, A.N., Bouwman, C.H.S., 2013. How does capital affect bank performance during ﬁnancial crises? J. Financial Econ. 109, 146–176.
Berger, A.N., Cai, J., Roman, R.A., Sedunov, J., 2021. Supervisory enforcement actions
against banks and systemic risk. J. Bank. Finance forthcoming.
Brous, P.A., Leggett, K., 1996. Wealth effects of enforcement actions against ﬁnancially distressed banks. J. Financial Res. 19, 561–577.
Brunmeier, J., Willardson, M.D., 2006. Supervisory enforcement actions since FIRREA
and FDICIA. Region 22–27 & 38-43.
Desai, H., Rajgopal, S., Yu, J.J., 2016. Were information intermediaries sensitive to
the ﬁnancial statement-based leading indicators of bank distress prior to the
ﬁnancial crisis? Contemp. Acc. Res. 33, 576–606.
Deli, Y.D., Delis, M.D., Hasan, I., Liu, L., 2019. Enforcement of banking regulation and
the cost of borrowing. J. Bank. Finance 101, 147–160.
Delis, M.D., Staikouras, P.K., Tsoumas, C., 2017. Formal enforcement actions and bank
behavior. Manage. Sci. 63, 959–987.
Gilbert, R.A., Vaughan, M.D., 2001. Do depositors care about enforcement actions? J.
Econ. Bus. 53, 283–311.
Grinblatt, M., Titman, S., 1989. Mutual fund performance: an analysis of quarterly
portfolio holdings. J. Bus. 62, 393–416.
Grossman, S.J., Stiglitz, J.E., 1980. On the impossibility of informationally eﬃcient
markets. Am. Econ. Rev. 70, 393–408.
Hasan, I., Massoud, N., Saunders, A., Song, K., 2015. Which ﬁnancial stocks did short
sellers target in the subprime crisis? J. Bank. Finance 54, 87–103.
Henry, T.R., Kisgen, D.J., Wu, J.(J.), 2015. Equity short selling and bond rating downgrades. J. Financial Intermed. 24, 89–111.
Jordan, J.S., Peek, J., Rosengren, E.S., 20 0 0. The market reaction to the disclosure of
supervisory actions: implications for bank transparency. J. Financial Intermed.
9, 298–319.
Karpoff, J.M., Lou, X., 2010. Short sellers and ﬁnancial misconduct. J. Finance 65,
1879–1913.
Liu, M., Ma, T., Zhang, Y., 2012. Are short sellers informed? Evidence from the
20 07-20 08 subprime mortgage crisis. Financial Rev. 47, 199–218.
Roman, R.A., 2020. Winners and losers from supervisory enforcement actions
against banks. J. Corp. Finance 60, 101516.
Slovin, M.B., Sushka, M.E., Polonchek, J.A., 1999. An analysis of contagion and competitive effects at commercial banks. J. Financial Econ. 54, 197–225.

5. Conclusions
Formal EAs are important bank supervisory tools. Due to their
public nature, however, bank and security market regulators, along
with bank management, are justiﬁed in expressing concern regarding whether publicly-traded bank EAs – through information revelation and imposed restrictions – inﬂuence public equity values in
a manner that interacts with regulatory intent. As an example, EAs
can coincide with increased short selling and lower bank equity
values thereby exacerbating efforts to restore regulatory capital adequacy. During times of ﬁnancial crisis, almost by deﬁnition we expect an unusually high number of EAs. Increased EA-related short
selling across multiple banks could increase systemic risk. Given
crisis conditions, to attenuate short seller feedback effects, bank
regulators might favor non-public actions (e.g., MOUs) rather than
publicly-announced EAs. However, Berger et al. (2021) ﬁnd that use
of formal EAs is important for reducing systemic risk, particularly
during ﬁnancial crises, and that “more severe EAs and EAs against
banks are more effective in systemic risk reduction than those less
severe” (p. 0).24
Our ﬁndings indicate that EAs correlate with a reduction in
crisis-era short selling. Such a reduction adds another reason why
crisis-era EAs may attenuate, rather than exacerbate, systemic risk.
During the 20 07–20 09 ﬁnancial crisis, following EA initiations, we
ﬁnd on average less short selling in ﬁrms operating with an EA
than in comparable ﬁrms that never receive one. Our ﬁndings
support our hypotheses that in ﬁnancial crises, short sellers predominantly position prior to EAs and that EA initiations then act
as information-homogenizing and proﬁt-taking events reducing in-

24

Berger et al. (2021) do not examine short selling.
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